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INTRODUCTION
The statement of facts offered in respondents' brief
requires response because it is encumbered by both inaccurate and
irrelevant details. Throughout the course of these proceedings
the defendants have attempted to divert the focus of this action
away from the legal questions presented.

They seek to focus on

Mr. Swayne's relationship with the child's mother, instead of his
relationship with the child, in the hope that the Court will
share their moral judgment that Mr. SWayne's refusal to marry the
mother somehow disqualifies him from having any parental rights.
This attempt is pointless.

The illegitimacy of the child is the

starting point of the legal analysis in this case.

It is settled

and beyond dispute that the father of an illegitimate child has
constitutionally protected parental rights; whether the defendants would have it be so is of no significance.

The issue

presented here whether those unquestioned rights were terminated
in a manner consistent with constitutional requirements.
The defendantsf statement of facts also distorts the
record with regard to the relevant events which preceded and
followed the release of the child by her mother.

Penny never

discussed with Steven the "possibility of placing the baby for
adoption".

(Respondents' brief at 4)i. She informed him that hei

parents wanted her to place the child for adoption.

In response

to this information Steven "said that I shouldn't let them talk
me into anything, that it should be my decision, that if I didn't
want the baby, I could give it to hirrt" (Tr. at 10).
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Ms. Paxmanfs dealings with L.D.S. Social Services were
at the behest of her parents.

Her decision to release the child

for adoption on June 8 was, in her words on the stand and not in
defense counsel's as set forth in an affidavit, based upon the
following considerations:
Because at that point in time, I felt that I
was not emotionally stable enough to care for
a baby. My parents had told me that I could
have no contact with my family if I kept the
baby, and I was also worried about what
support I'd receive from Steven, not so much
financially but emotionally. I guess at that
time I felt that they would take the pressure
off of me that my parents were putting on me,
and that's the thing that I should do such
when I signed the papers.
(Tr. at 37).
L.D.S. Social Services' representative, Elda Bowen,
"counseled" Ms. Paxman about the experiences of another white
woman who had kept a "mixed" child and explained how the black
father in that case had failed to fulfill his responsibilities.
(Tr., Vol. II, at 6-7). She also urged Ms. Paxman to sign the
release forms for the child on June 8, even though she was going
to keep the baby through the next day "so Steven wouldn't have an
opportunity to file his paternity."

(Tr., Vol. II, at 7-8).

Prior to signing this release Penny had informed Ms. Bowen that
Steven "had been involved throughout the pregnancy" and "had been
there at the hospital".

(Tr. at 35).

These events happened on June 8, after Ms. Paxman and
the child had visited Steven in his apartment.

While the defen-

dants now deny that this visit is evidenced in the record (after
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previously stipulating to it in Federal court), it is described
by Mr* Swayne in his deposition, which defendants made part of
the record in the Court below.

(Swayne depo. at 44-45).

The

next day, when Ms. Paxman returned with the child "so he could
see the baby one last time" (Respondents' brief at 7), Steven had
no idea of, and was not told of, the proposed adoption (Tr. at
16).

Ms. Paxman then left for California.

Contrary to incorrect

assertion of defendants that Ms. Paxman only made two subsequent
contacts with Steven (Respondents' brief at 7), she testified
that she called him from Las Vegas on|the way and after getting
to San Diego "I called three more times from there, and then all
three times I let on that I still had the baby."

(Tr. at 16).

She then called his family and said the baby was dead.
Two other misstatements in the respondents' brief
deserve mention because they have recurred throughout these
proceedings even though they are not supported by the evidence.
The defendants assert that Mr. Swayne "refused" to sign an
acknowledgment of paternity form in the hospital.

The testimony,

however, is that he did not "refuse" to sign the paper, but it
simply didn't get done before Ms. Pa^iman's mother checked her oul
of the hospital (Tr. at 11-12).

Furthermore, the assertion that

hospital personnel explained to Ms. Paxman that Mr. Swayne could
not have his name placed on the birthj certificate unless he
signed "an Acknowledgment of Paternity form, supplied by the
hospital, signifying his 'willingness and intent to support [the
child to the best of [his] ability'" (Respondents' brief at 5-6)
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is a product only of the defendants' imagination.

Ms. Paxman

testified that the
hospital clerk came in to fill out the birth
certificate, and when she came to the section
for the father's name she recognized that we
were not married, and she said at that time
we had to go down to the office in the
hospital and have him fill out a paternity
form in front of a notary public. But it was
just described to me as a form to have his
name put on the birth certificate. She did
not describe that it was a form that he was
claiming he was the father.
(Tr. at 11)
Q.

It was your testimony, wasn't it, that a
nurse came in and was helping fill out
some hospital information regarding the
birth certificate and at that time found
out that you were not married?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And she explained to you at that time
that there was something that the father
needed to sign?

A.

She explained it as it was a form to
have the name put on the birth certificate. That was the only way it was
explained to me.

Q.

Did she say that it had to be signed in
order to have his name put on the birth
certificate?

A.

Yes, she did.

Q.

It had to be signed where, did she say?

A.

Had to be signed in front of a notary
public, and she said that they had one
there in the hospital but only until
later that night.

(Tr. at 32)
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The defendants assert a "refusal" which doesn't exist
in an effort to imply that Mr. Swayne consciously disregarded a
known obligation to sign the form or forfeit his parental rights.
The evidence is entirely contrary (Tr., Vol. II, at 11). In
fact, in the Federal action the defendants stipulated to Mr.
Swaynefs ignorance of the filing requirement.

See Swayne v.

L.D.S. Social Services, 670 F.Supp. 1537, 1539 (D. Utah 1987).
Whether or not defendants feel bound by prior stipulations, the
uncontroverted evidence is that Mr. Swayne had no knowledge of
the filing requirement and the defendants' after the fact effort
to imply that it was explained to him in the hospital is simply
not supported by the evidence and is 4 conscious attempt to
mislead this Court.
Additionally, the defendants have repeatedly asserted
that Mr. Swayne intends to "give" his child to his sister.
(Respondents' brief at 8, 26). While there is no question Steven
has discussed with his sister and brother-in-law ways in which
they may help him raise the child, Mr. Swayne testified unequivocally that he wants custody of the child (Tr., Vol. II at 27).
Furthermore, the fact that he might temporarily place some of the
responsibility for raising the child in family members is perfectly consistent with the exercise of his parental rights.

It

is so fundamental that Utah law expressly recognizes the right oi
parents to make temporary delegations of their parental rights.
Utah Code Ann. §75-5-103 (Rep. Vol. 8A 1978)
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Indeed, the rights of a parent to call upon the assistance of his extended family in raising his child is one which is
of constitutional significance.

Although the defendants seem to

believe that Mr. Swayne should be held up to ridicule for seeking
familial assistance in raising his daughter, the United States
Supreme Court has noted that the
tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and
especially grandparents sharing a household
along with parents and children has roots
equally venerable and deserving of constitutional recognition [as those of the nuclear
family]. Over the years millions of our
citizens have grown up in just such an
environment, and most, surely, have profited
from it. Even if the condition of modern
society have brought about a decline in
extended family households, they have not
erased the accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries and honored
throughout our history, that supports a
larger conception of the family. Out of
choice, necessity, or a sense of family
responsibility, it has been common for close
relatives to draw together and participate in
the duties and satisfactions of a common
home. Decisions concerning child rearing,
which Yoder, Mayer, Pierce and other cases
have recognized as entitled to constitutional
protection, long have been shared with
grandparents or other relatives who occupy
the same household - indeed who may take on
major responsibility for the rearing of the
children. Especially in times of adversity,
such as the death of a spouse or economic
need, the broader family has tended to come
together for mutual sustenance and to maintain or rebuild a secure home life. . . .
Whether or not such a household is established because of personal tragedy, the
choice of relatives in this degree of kinship
to live together may not lightly be denied by
the State . . . . the Constitution prevents
[the State] from standardizing its children and its adults - by forcing all to live in
certain narrowly defined family patterns.
- 6-

Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U,S. 494, 504-506 (1977).
Despite the defendants1 apparent belief that only two
parent nuclear family homes are suitable for child rearing, the
Constitution will not tolerate effort^ to impose "suburbia1s
preference in patterns of family living.ff

Matter of Adoption of

Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1076 (Okla. 1985) (Kauger, J.,
dissenting).
The defendants repeated efforts to color the evidence
in a manner which they believe calls Mr. Swaynefs parental
fitness into question highlights the constitutional infirmity of
the statutory scheme under consideration because, despite the
defendants' incessant moralizing about Mr. Swaynefs lifestyle,
the statute absolutely forbids a Court from permitting Mr. Swayne
an opportunity to present evidence of his fitness.

Fitness is

nowhere mentioned in the statute with which this action is
concerned and it is Mr. Swayne who is asserting that it must be,
not L.D.S. Social Services.
While the plaintiff has consistently tried to minimize
references to the racial and religious bigotry which caused his
daughter to be surrendered by her mother, because the constitutional issues requiring analysis do not concern those facts, the
defendants have adamantly refused to limit their presentation to
the relevant facts. This failure is, no doubt, due to the
perceived weakness of their legal arguments. When choosing the
evidence to marshall to "document11 why Mr. Swayne isn't a "carinc
and involved" father, the defendants begin by reciting that he is
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a 22-year-old single black man who lives in an apartment (Respondents' brief at 2-3). While plaintiff has no doubt that the
relevance of these facts on the question of fitness seemed
manifest to the author of respondent's brief, plaintiff is
equally confident that this court will decide the issue presented
on the basis of appropriate considerations.
It was Steven Swayne, and his family, who held a baby
shower to celebrate the birth of this child; it was Steven
Swayne, and his family, who attended at birth and visited in the
hospital; it was Steven Swayne, and his family, who proposed to
raise and care for this child; and it is Steven Swayne who is
still doing everything in his power to obtain custody of his
daughter.

It was Ms. Paxman who abandoned this child because of

pressure from her parents, who hold the view that blacks and
whites are racially incompatible (Respondents1 brief at 4).

The

question presented is whether or not Utah's statutory scheme,
which purports to honor Ms. Paxman's wishes and frustrate Mr.
Swayne's, is constitutional.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

AS ONLY THE STATE CAN TERMINATE
PARENTAL RIGHTS, A STATUTE WHICH
PURPORTS TO GRANT PRIVATE PERSONS
THE POWER TO TERMINATE A PARENT'S
RIGHTS ALSO MAKES THE CONDUCT OF
SUCH INDIVIDUALS STATE ACTION

The defendants' contention that this case involves no
state action was exhaustively addressed and rejected by Judge
Greene.

His opinion in Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 670
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F.Supp. 1537 (D. Utah), is a compelling response to this argument
and is appended to this brief for the convenience of the Court.
The only additional response required is to note that
the defendants1 assertion that adoption isn't the exclusive
prerogative of the state misses the wl^ole point in issue. The
termination of parental rights .is the exclusive prerogative of
the state.

This is not an adoption case, it is a challenge to

the statutorily mandated termination of the parental rights of
Steven Swayne which occurred when L.D.S. Social Services took
custody of his daughter.
POINT II

TERMINATION OF PLAINTIFF'S PARENTAL
RIGHTS WOULD BE A DENIAL OF THE
EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES OF THE
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS

The defendants have made absolutely no attempt to offer
any plausible justification for the gender based discrimination
in Utah's statute which requires unwed fathers to file a document
to protect their parental rights but places no such requirement
on unwed mothers.

They refer generally to the history of the

common law's refusal to recognize paternal rights in illegitimate
children, but the reference is pointless because the United
States Supreme Court has expressly repudiated the notion that
unwed fathers have no constitutionally protected interest in
their children.

Stanley v. Georgia, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

The

fact of the matter is that whether the defendants approve or not,
the "day is gone when the putative father has no parental rights
under the law."

State ex rel. Wingard, 223 Kan. 661, 665, 576

P.2d 620, 624 (1978).
- 9 -

Equally pointless is the defendants1 reference to the
common law presumption that mothers are better custodians of
young children than fathers.

The defendants suggest that this

presumption retains its vitality, but this assertion is absolutely false.

The Utah Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged that

such a presumption is inconsistent with the equal protection
guarantees of the state and federal constitutions.
Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986).

Pusey v.

The Court noted that the

presumption was not only unconstitutional, it was wrong.
Even ignoring the constitutional infirmities of the maternal preference, the rule
lacks validity because it is unnecessary and
perpetuates outdated stereotypes.
728 P.2d at 120.
Not surprisingly, and despite the defendants1 suggestion to the contrary,

every recent decision which addresses the

old presumption of custody in the mother, in cases involving
children born to unwed parents, rejects the viability of that
presumption.

See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Scott v. Martin,

252 Pa.Super. 118, 381 A.2d 173 (Pa.App. 1977); Brazemore v.
Davis, 394 A.2d 1377 (D.C.App. 1978); Brauch v. Shaw, 121 N.H.
562, 432 A.2d 1 (1981); Heyer v. Peterson, 307 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa
1981); Smith v. Watson, 425 So.2d 1030 (Miss. 1983); Matter of
Custody of Bourey, 127 Ill.App.3d 530, 469 N.E.2d 386 (Ill.App.
1984).
The defendants simply cannot accept the notion that mer
and women can be similarly situated in their relationship with
their child even though they don't share the same sex.
- 10 -

In fact,

their whole argument is premised on the foundation that the "two
parents of an illegitimate child are not similarly situated."
The only argument they advance in support of this proposition,
however, is the outdated stereotype of the common law which has
been uniformly rejected.
In declaring its state's adoption statute unconstitutional because of its discrimination in favor of unwed mothers
and against unwed fathers, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted
that the only difference between unwec^ mothers and fathers is
their sex.

Any differing statutory treatment of such parents is,

therefore, an unjustifiable discrimination on the basis of sex.
The only differences between unwed fathers
and unwed mothers are those based on sex.
This is an impermissible basis for denying
unwed fathers rights [under the statute].
Adoption of Walker, 360 A.2d 603, 606 (Pa. 1976).
As a matter of federal constitutional law, the United
States Supreme Court has noted that any statutory discrimination,
based solely on the sex of the parent and not on the nature of
his or her relationship with the child, is a violation of equal
protection because any
undifferentiated distinction between unwed
mothers and unwed fathers, applicable in all
circumstances where a child of theirs is at
issue, does not bear a substantial relationship to the State's asserted interests.
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979).
The undifferentiated distinction in Utah's, statute
bears no substantial relationship to any asserted state interest
because no matter how compelling the state's interest in speedily
- 11 -

identifying willing parents for newborn illegitimate children,
every argument in favor of requiring fathers to promptly register
also applies to mothers.

For example, the defendants acknowledge

that Mr. Swaynefs identity and location were known but they
assert that he can be required to file because "his legal commitment to the child was not [known]."
Why isnft she required to file?

Neither was the mother's.

Because she is a woman.

In an effort to avoid having to identify some
compelling reason which justifies this invidious discrimination,
defendants seek instead to suggest that the issue has already
been addressed by the United States Supreme Court.

The assertion

that the facts of this case are "very similar" to the facts of
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), is intellectually
dishonest.

The statute being considered in Lehr provided for

several ways in which a father could preserve his rights, two of
which would offer protection to Mr. Swayne.

He filed his notice

of paternity prior to any adoption of his child and the mother
signed a sworn statement of his paternity prior to any adoption
of the child.

463 U.S. at 251. Mr. Lehr's child was more than

two years old when his rights were terminated; Mr. Swaynefs less
than a week.

Mr. Lehr's child was adopted by her stepfather; Mr.

Swaynefs child was given to strangers.

Perhaps most telling is

the fact that the Court in Lehr expressly held that "these
statutes may not be constitutionally applied in that class of
cases where the mother and father are in fact similarly situated
with regard to their relationship with the child."
267.
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463 U.S. at

Of course, the defendants simply reject the notion that
men and women can be similarly situated in their relationship
with the child because they don't shaife the same sex.

Obviously,

the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have
both repudiated this outdated sexual prejudice.
In addition to the equal protection provision embodied
in the Utah Constitution in Art. 1 §24, Utah's Constitution also
requires that men and women enjoy equally
and religious rights and privileges.ff

ff

all civil, political

Constitution of Utah,

Article IV §1. Under Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(3) (Rep. Vol. 9
1987) women are accorded the absolute right to consent before
their illegitimate children can be adopted.
this right.

Men do not share

The statute differentiates between men and women in

relation to parental rights, which rights are "fundamental to our
society.ff

In Re J.P. , 648 P.2d 1364, 1375 (Utah 1982).
No amount of sophistry can excuse this blatant viola-

tion of the equal protection principles set forth in the Constitution.

The statute is manifestly unconstitutional.
The defendants' continual reference to an unwed fa-

ther's "provisional" paternal rights, which are subject to
forfeiture if he does not come forward, provides no justification
for termination of Mr. Swayne's rights. How much earlier can a
father begin establishing his relationship with his child than
Mr. Swayne did when he was present for her birth?
Mr. Swayne "came forward" immediately.

The problem, of

course, is that the statute requires nim to come forward in a

- 13 -

different way.

However, because it placed no such requirement on

Ms. Paxman it cannot be constitutionally applied to the facts of
this case.
POINT III APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE IN
QUESTION WOULD VIOLATE DUE PROCESS.
In his initial brief, plaintiff argued that the conclusive presumption of abandonment contained in Utah Code Ann.
§78-30-4(3)(c) (Rep. Vol. 9 1987), would be violative of due
process if applied to him because all the evidence demonstrates
that he clearly did not abandon his little girl.
simply chose not to respond to this argument.

The defendant

The question

remains, therefore, in what way did Mr. Swayne abandon his
interest in his child?
with the statute.

The only answer is that he didn't comply

If a statute mandates a finding which is

inconsistent with what a factual inquiry may reveal, then the
statute violates due process. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441
(1973); Lafleur v. Cleveland Board of Education, 414 U.S. 632
(1974).
POINT IV

THE STATUTE IN QUESTION VIOLATES
UTAH'S OPEN COURT PROVISION

The defendants1 response to the assertion that the
statute violates Art. 1 §11 of the Utah Constitution is truly
quite strange.

They assert that because he is in Court, plain-

tiff hasn't been denied access to the Courts.
The statute expressly provides that Mr. Swayne is
"barred from . . . bringing or maintaining any action to establish his paternity of the child.ff

By saying that the Courts hav<
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never enforced the provision the defendants implicitly acknowledge that it is unenforceable because it is unconstitutional.
The Courts cannot be closed to the assertion of fundamental,
constitutionally protected rights.

A statute which purports to

do so violates Art. 1 §11.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the course of this case the plaintiff has
repeatedly posed two questions of constitutional significance.
Why does an unwed father have to file and not an unwed mother?
In what way did Mr. Swayne demonstrate an intent to abandon his
opportunity interest in his parental rights in relation to his
daughter?

Neither has been answered satisfactorily by the

defendants.
The answer that mothers are presumed to be fit and
loving and fathers aren't has been rejected as inconsistent with
equal protection principle.

The answer that the statute

irrebuttably presumes abandonment is inconsistent with due
process principles.
The appropriate resolution of this action is manifest.
In an attempt to persuade this Court tfc> adopt a position not
supported by the law, defendants imply that Mr. Swayne is personally incapable of being a caring father and suggest to the Court
that adherence to the Constitution wilfL have "serious detrimental
impact" on Mr. Swayne's child.

(Respondents1 brief at 29 n. 10).

Mr. Swayne is fit to be a father but Utah law gives him
no forum in which to prove it. Mr. Swayne1s child would be
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benefited by knowing her father and her natural family, by
looking into the faces of her human history, but Utah law provides no forum in which to prove it-

Mr. Swayne wants to take

his opportunity to care and provide for his daughter, but Utah's
statutory law prohibits it.

The Utah law is unconstitutional and

its detrimental impact on the lives of parents and children will
continue until it is declared to be so.
DATED this

day of June, 1988.

M. David Eckersley

Billy L. Walker, Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of
the foregoing were delivered this
day of June, 1988, to
David M. McConkie, Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 330 South 300
East, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111.
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ADDENDUM

SWAYNE v. L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES
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Liberal, Kansas. Thus, in order to keep
presentation of evidence to the jury running smoothly, it would be more expeditious to try the case in Topeka. The court
notes that the defendants represent that
Fred Phelps, plaintiffs counsel, has agreed
that the case should be tried in Topeka.
The court therefore finds that defendants'
Bunnell and Arheart's motion to transfer
the trial setting to Topeka is hereby granted.
IT IS BY THE COURT THEREFORE
ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of the Court's Memorandum
and Order filed April 8, 1987, which granted summary judgment to defendant Duckworth on the grounds of judicial immunity
is hereby denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for leave to
file a second amendment to her complaint
is granted in part. Plaintiff shall have
leave to file a second amendment to name
the State of Kansas as a party defendant.
Plaintiffs motion for leave to file a second
amendment to the complaint which names
Keaton G. Duckworth as a defendant is
hereby denied. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants Bunnell and
Arheart's motion to transfer the trial setting to Topeka is hereby granted.
DATED: This 26th day of June, 1987, at
Kansas City, Kansas.

£
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Steven H. SWAYNE, Plaintiff,
v.
L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, John Doe,
Jane Doe and Leslie Doe, in his or her
official capacity as a District Court
Judge of the Third District Court of the
State of Utah, Defendants.
Civ. No. 87-C-Q591G.
United States District Court,
D. Utah, CD.

tempted to gain right of custody, care and
control of newborn child who had been
surrendered by mother to private adoption
agency. On motion to dismiss by adoption
agency and prospective adoptive parents,
and putative father's motion for preliminary injunction, the District Court, J.
Thomas Greene, J., held that: (1) private
adoption agency and prospective adoptive
parents were "state actors" through utilization of adoption statute for purposes of
father's § 1983 action; (2) proper persons
were named as parties; and (3) abstention
by federal court was required.
Motion to dismiss granted.

1. Civil Rights <s=>13.5(4)
Invocation of state statute, which required that any time custody of illegitimate
child is relinquished by mother, father's
parental rights will be automatically cut off
unless notice of paternity previously has
been filed by biological father, by private
individual such as adoption agency or attorney constitutes state action for purposes of
§ 1983 civil rights action brought by biological father for purposes of regaining
custody of infant. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983;
U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4.
2. Civil Rights <5=>13.11
In § 1983 action by putative father for
determination of his parental rights, which
challenged operation of statute which provided that father of illegitimate child conclusively is presumed to have abandoned
child if he fails to file claim of paternity
and notice of willingness to support child
prior to time child is placed by mother with
licensed adoption agency, father was only
required to name as parties child's mother
who relinquished all custody and control of
child, adoption agency, and prospective
adoptive parents. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983;
U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4.

Sept 3, 1987.
Putative father of infant brought action pursuant to § 1983 in which he at-

3. Federal Courts <3=>48
Federal court abstained from rendering decision in putative father's challenge

1538

670 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT

to termination of his parental rights by
operation of state adoption statute, though
he named proper parties in § 1983 action;
father may be able to establish that as
applied, state statute was violative of
greater protections of State Constitution,
thereby mooting federal constitutional
question and case presented important
questions of state law. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1983; U.C.A.1953, 78-30-4.
M. David Eckersley, Billy L. Walker, Jr.,
Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff.
David M. McConkie, B. Lloyd Poelman,
Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
J. THOMAS GREENE, District
Judge.
This matter came on for hearing on July
27, 1987 on defendants1 motion to dismiss
and plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction. Defendants were represented by
David M. McConkie and B. Lloyd Poelman
and plaintiff was represented by M. David
Eckersley and Billy L. Walker, Jr. Plaintiff and defendants submitted memorandums of law and a stipulated statement of
facts and the court heard oral argument,
after which the matters were taken under
advisement. The court is now fully advised and sets forth its Memorandum Decision and Order.
BACKGROUND
This suit is brought by plaintiff against
L.D.S. Social Services, a non-profit private
adoption agency affiliated with the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; John
Doe and Jane Doe, who are prospective
adoptive parents of the newborn child of
which plaintiff is the biological father; and
Leslie Doe, who is asserted to be a District
Court Judge of the Third District Court of
Utah who plaintiff believes has presently
before him or her a petition for adoption.
Plaintiff has brought suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and requests that this court declare
that he has the right of custody, care and
control of the newborn child, that the provi-

sions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 (1984)
be declared violative of the United States
Constitution, that Judge Doe be enjoined
from entering any Decree of Adoption
without plaintiffs consent, and that damages be awarded as against defendant
L.D.S. Social Services. The immediate matter of a preliminary injunction involves a
request by plaintiff that he be granted
custody and that defendant L.D.S. Social
Services be enjoined from continuing to
exercise custody over the child.
Plaintiff ^nd defendants have filed a
statement containing the following stipulated facts: I
1. Stevfen Swayne is the natural father of a lj)aby girl born out of wedlock
on June 4, 1987.
2. Penny Paxman is the mother of
the child.
3. Both Steven Swayne and Penny
Paxman aite life-long residents of the
State of Utah and resided in the State of
Utah at all times pertinent to the facts
and circumstances in this matter.
4. Steven Swayne first learned that
Penny Paxman was pregnant in October,
1986.
5. Steven Swayne and Penny Paxman
are not now married nor have they ever
been married At no time during Penny
Paxman's pregnancy or prior to the relinquishment of the child to L.D.S. Social
Services did Steven Swayne offer to marry Penny Pajxman or offer to financially
support Pemjiy Paxman.
6. At no time during the pregnancy
or prior to the relinquishment of the child
did Steven Swayne and Penny Paxman
have any plar^ or intention to live together in a family unit.
7. Steven Swayne was present in the
hospital when! the child was born on June
4, 1987, and visited the child and Penny
Paxman while they were in the hospital.
While in the ^ospital, Mr. Swfayne was
told that it wak necessary for him to sign
a document in order to have his name
placed on the child's birth certificate.
Mr. Swayne djd not sign the necessary
document or acknowledgment of paternity before the Child was discharged from
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the hospital or before the child was relinquished to L.D.S. Social Services and
therefore his name does not appear on
the child's birth certificate.
8. Penny Paxman's mother discharged Penny and the baby from the
hospital on June 6, 1987, and made financial arrangements for hospital expenses.
Mr. Swayne has not paid any of the
hospital expenses or paid any of the expenses for the baby's support.
9. Prior to the pregnancy and during
the course of the pregnancy, Penny Paxman resided with her parents. After being released from the hospital, Penny
Paxman and her child returned to her
parent's home.
10. Steven Swayne offered to make
arrangements for Penny Paxman to
move in with his mother. However, Penny Paxman would have provided her own
living expenses.
11. Penny Paxman signed an affidavit releasing the child to L.D.S. Social
Services on June 8, 1987, and physically
surrendered custody of the child the next
day.
12. Steven Swayne did not register
with the Registrar of Vital Statistics in
the Department of Health a notice of his
claim of paternity of an illegitimate child
and of his willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability
prior to the date the illegitimate child
was relinquished or placed with L.D.S.
•Social Services for adoption.
13. Steven Swayne filed his acknowledgment of paternity on June 15, 1987,
which was the first working day after he
learned that the child had been placed for
adoption.
14. During the course of the pregnancy, Steven Swayne and Penny Paxman
discussed the fact that Penny Paxman's
parents wanted her to place the baby for
adoption. Penny Paxman did not inform
Mr. Swayne that she did or did not intend
to surrender the child for adoption.
15. L.D.S. Social Services placed the
child for adoption with an adoptive family on June 12, 1987, in conformity with
the requirements of Utah statutes.

16. In the event Steven Swayne is
granted custody of the child, Mr. Swayne
intends to place the child under the primary care of members of his family until
such time as he can become more stable.
17. On June 15, 1987, Steven Swayne
and Penny Paxman requested an amendment to the birth certificate of the child
naming Steven Swayne as the father of
the child.
18. During the course of the pregnancy and thereafter Mr. Swayne told his
family and others that he was the father
of the child.
19. Penny Paxman took the baby to
Steven Swayne's apartment for a short
visit once before the relinquishment to
L.D.S. Social Services and once after the
relinquishment.
- 20. Mr. Swayne was unaware of his
duty to file an acknowledgment of paternity and willingness to support the child
until after the child had been released by
the mother for adoption.
21. On June 15, 1987, both Mr.
Swayne and Penny Paxman appeared at
the offices of L.D.S. Social Services and
asked that custody be given to Mr.
Swayne.
22. L.D.S. Social Services has testified that at the time of the relinquishment of the child to L.D.S. Social Services Penny Paxman did not disclose the
identity of Steven Swayne and advised
L.D.S. Social Services that he would not
take responsibility for the child and that
she did not want L.D.S. Social Services to
contact him.
23. On February 9, 1986, Steven
Swayne consented to the adoptive placement of another illegitimate child by a
different woman. L.D.S. Social Services
requested and obtained his consent.
Defendant L.D.S. Social Sendees urges
this court to dismiss plaintiffs complaint
for lack of jurisdiction because of failure to
allege "state action/' and on the further
ground that this court should abstain from
exercising jurisdiction in favor of resolution by the state courts of Utah. The
defendants also urge dismissal of plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction pri-
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marily because of lack of substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I. State Action
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part:
"No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." (emphasis added). The protections
of the Fourteenth Amendment thus apply
only if the deprivation of life, liberty, or
property is by governmental "state action"
rather by than purely private action. The
fundamental policies of the state action
principle are to preserve an area of individ1. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 VS. 922,
936-37, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753, 73 L.Ed.2d 482
(1982); Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250,
83 S.Ct. 1119, 1133, 10 L.Ed.2d 323 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3. 17, 3 S.Ct. 18, 25, 27 L.Ed. 835
(1883); see generally L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 18-2 at 1149 (1978).
2.
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In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct.
1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) the Court recognized the weighty "liberty" interest of one father
of illegitimate children in maintaining custody
of those children with whom he had a fully
developed parental relationship:
The private interest here, that of a man in the
children he has sired and raised, undeniably
warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection. It is plain
that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or
her children *'come[s] to this Court with a
momentum for respect lacking when appeal is
made to liberties which derive merely from
shifting economic arrangements." Kovacs v.
Cooper [336 U.S. 77. 69 S.Ct. 448. 93 L.Ed. 513
(1949)]
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The
rights to conceive and to raise one's children
have been deemed "essential," Meyer v. Nebraska [262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed.
1042 (1923) ] . . . "basic civil rights of man,"
Skinner v. Oklahoma, [316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct.
1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942)] . . . and "[r]ights
far more precious . . . than property rights,"
May v. Anderson [345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840,
97 L.Ed. 1221 ( 1 9 5 3 ) ] . . . . "It is cardinal
with us that the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither

ual freedom to make choices without the
constraints of the Constitution's prohibitions, to further the policy of federalism by
reserving tx^ the state discretion to deal
with perceived private wrongs without the
constraints of supreme federal law, and to
further the policy of separation of powers
by limiting the wrongs redressable by the
federal judiciary absent congressional enactment granting such authority.1
The "liberty" interest asserted by plaintiff in this c|ase involves termination of all
parental rights in connection with his newborn child, including visitation and custodial rights. Without delving deeply into the
merits, this court recognizes that plaintiff
has asserted a liberty interest that has
been acknowledged by the Supreme Court
to be worthy of constitutional protection.2
supply n^r hinder" Prince v. Massachusetts
[321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645
(1944)
Id. at 651, ^2 S.Ct. at 1212. More recently the
Court distinguished the lesser constitutional interest of a (putative father in the potential to
develop a future parental relationship with his
child:
The difference between the developed parentchild relationship that was implicated in Stanley and daban [v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
99 S.Ct. lfaO, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) ]. and the
potential relationship involved in Quilloin [v.
Walcott, ^34 VS. 246. 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d
511 (197$)] and this case, is both clear and
significant. When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward to
participate in the rearing of his child," Caban,
. . . his interest in personal contact with his
child acquires substantial protection under
the Due Process Clause. At that point it may
be said that he "act[s] as a father toward his
children...." But the mere existence of a
biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection
The significance of
the biological connection is that it offers the
natural father an opportunity that no other
male possesses to develop a relationship with
his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity
and accebts some measure of responsibility
for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of th^ parent-child relationship and make
uniquely valuable contributions to the child's
development. If he fails to do so, the Federal
Constitution will not automatically compel a
State to listen to his opinion of where the
child's be|st interests lie.
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248. 261-62, 103
S.Ct. 2985, ^993, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (emphasis added). Some courts and commentators
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The statute which plaintiff seeks to challenge under due process and equal protection provides that the father of an illegitimate child conclusively is presumed to
have abandoned his child if he fails to file a
claim of paternity and notice of willingness
to support the child prior to the time the
child is placed by the mother with a licensed adoption agency, or prior to the
time a petition is filed by a person with
whom the mother has placed the child for
adoption.3 The state action question is
whether termination of plaintiffs parental
rights by operation of the above statute
implicates the actors in a private adoption
to the extent that they may be considered
to be state actors for the purpose of testing
whether plaintiffs parental rights were
constitutionally terminated. This court is
persuaded that the statute has such an
effect. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482
(1982) the Supreme Court delineated a twostep inquiry in resolving the issue of state
action:
First, the deprivation must be caused by
the exercise of some right or privilege
created by the State or by a rule of
conduct imposed by the State or by a
person for whom the State is responsible
Second, the party charged
with the deprivation must be a person
have determined that the potential interest recognized in Lehr may require greater constitutional protection if it is asserted, as in this case,
at or near the time of birth rather than after a
significant lapse of time as in Lehr. See In re
Matter of Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 358
S.E.2d 459 (1987); In re Baby Girl M, 37 Cal.3d
65, 207 Cal.Rptr. 309, 688 P.2d 918, 924 (1984);
E. Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of
Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 Ohio St.L.Rev. 313, 351-371 (1984).
That question need not be resolved in analyzing
state action. It should be noted, however, that
the liberty interest asserted here is subject to the
lesser protection of Lehr as an opportunity to
develop a relationship with the child, rather
than non-interruption of an existing relationship.
3.

The statute reads in relevant part:
(1) A child cannot be adopted without the
consent of each living parent having rights in
relation to said child
(3)(a) A person who is the father or claims to
be the father of an illegitimate child may

who may fairly be said to be a state
actor.
Id. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2753-54. There can
be no question but that under Utah's statutory scheme the first part of the Lugar
test is met. "Undoubtedly the State was
responsible for the statute," Lugar, 457
U.S. at 938, 102 S.Ct. at 2754. Since the
first test is met, this court must determine
whether operation of the statute in this
case implicates defendants L.D.S. Social
Services and the prospective adoptive parents to a degree whereby they "may fairly
be said to be state actorfs]." Id. at 937,
102 S.Ct. at 2754.
[1] In focusing on the second determination, there is a critical distinction in the
operation of the above statute as compared
with many other state laws which may be
invoked by private parties. Here, the statute involved is self-operative and mandates the resultant termination of an illegitimate father's parental rights. The
State of Utah, not a private party, has
made an official policy decision that anytime custody of an illegitimate child is relinquished by the mother, the father's parental rights will be automatically cut off
unless a notice of paternity previously has
been filed by the biological father. That
state decision to terminate the father's paclaim rights pertaining to his paternity of the
child by registering with the registrar of vital
statistics in the department of health, a notice
of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate
child and of his willingness and intent to
support the child to the best of his ability
(b) The notice may be registered prior to the
birth of the child but must be registered prior
to the date the illegitimate child is relinquished
or placed with an agency licensed to provide
adoption services or prior to the filing of a
petition by a person with whom the mother
has placed the child for adoption
(c) Any father of such child who fails to file
and register his notice of claim to paternity
and his agreement to support the child shall
be barred from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to establish his paternity of
the child. Such failure shall further constitute
an abandonment of said child and a waiver
and surrender of any right to notice of or to a
hearing in any judicial proceeding for the
adoption of said child, and the consent of such
father to the adoption of such child shall not
be required.
(Emphasis added.)

rental rights is implemented through the
actor or actors who accept the child for
placement, whether a state entity, a private
licensed adoption agency, or any other person, for example an attorney. It would be
a total fiction to allow the state to remove
itself from its decision to cut off parental
rights simply because a private party triggers operation of the statute. The only
fair conclusion is that such a private party
becomes a "state actor" when his or her
actions bring the statute into play so as to
effectuate the pre-determined state decision to terminate parental rights.
This is not a case wherein state action
could be found because the legislation encouraged a private decision to discriminate.4 Also, it is not a case wherein the
decision of a private party to discriminate
based upon race or sex amounts to a state
decision because the private actor has some
"state" attributes or connection, such as
state funding or regulation.5 This case is
also distinguishable from the slippery slope
of private dispute resolution whereby a private party makes necessary use of some
state procedure and thereafter is challenged as a "state actor" for having deprived a plaintiff of liberty or property
based upon the state's involvement in cre4. Defendants have cited several cases for the
proposition that when a private party acts pursuant to a state law, there is state action only if
the state law authorizes conduct that was impermissible prior to the enactment. For example
in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 87 S.Ct.
1627, 18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1967) the Supreme Court
determined that an amendment to the California constitution permitting private discrimination in real estate transactions, which was previously prohibited by statute, constituted an official encouragement to the private decision to
discriminate, thereby transforming such private
decisions into state action. However, Reitman,
and the cases cited by defendants deal with a
completely different situation than is presented
here. In those cases the question was whether a
private decision may be attributed to the State
because it was encouraged by a state statute.
Here the statute in question increased rather
than decreased the rights of putative fathers
over what was recognized at common law. Accordingly, that statute would seem to have no
impact upon determination of the "state actor"
question.
5. See Burton w Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856. 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961);

ating such procedure or in failing to create
other procedures. State action may not be
present in the categories of cases just mentioned because in those cases private parties, rather than the state, made the essential decision to attempt to deprive a plaintiff of his or her liberty or property interest.*
Another consideration which comes into
play in determining whether state action is
present is the distinction between property
interests and liberty interests. Unlike disputes involving property in which private
parties may agree to some allocation or
disposition without any state involvement,
oftentimes the liberty interest can only be
severed! by the state. The distinction is
apparent in child custody-parental right
cases. Although a private party may deprive a parent of physical custody of his
child, only the state can irrevocably severe
all parental rights, which rights are recognized 4 s being "far more previous than
property rights/' 7
This ^ourt considers that under the circumstances of this case the conduct by
private I actors amounted to state action.
This conclusion follows from consideration
of the evident state mandated decision set
see abb Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct.
2777, 73 LEdJd 534 (1982); Rendell-Baker v.
Kohnf 457 VS. 830, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 L.Ed.2d
418 (1982).
6.

Compare, Flagg Brothers Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978);
(no s^ate action present) with Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 VS. 922. 102 S.Ct. 2744,
73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (state action present).

7. Santo\sky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758, 102
S.Ct. 1?88, 1397, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). The
Supreme Court said of the state's power to terminate parental rights:
Lassiter declared it "plain beyond the need for
multiple citation" that a natural parent's "desire fpr and right to 'the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his or her children*^* is an interest far more precious than
any property right . . . when the state initiates
a parental rights termination proceeding, it
seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental
liberty interest, but to end it
Few forms
of state action are both so severe and so irreversible.
Id. at 7^8-59, 102 S.Ct. at 1397 (emphasis added); sek also discussion at footnote 2, supra.
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forth in the self operative statute, and is
supported by several factually specific
"tests" of the Supreme Court. Perhaps
most readily applicable is the "public function" test.8 In Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42
L.Ed.2d 477 (1974) the Court dealt with an
individual decision by a privately owned
utility company to terminate a plaintiffs
utility service without notice and hearing,
In Jackson the court stated:
Petitioner next urges that state action is
present because respondent provides an
essential public service required to be
supplied on a reasonably continuous basis . . . and hence performs a "public
function/' We have, of course, found
state action present in the exercise by a
private entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State
If
we were dealing with the exercise by
Metropolitan of somej>ower delegated to
it by the State which is traditionally
associated with sovereignty, such as
eminent domain, our case would be
quite a different one.
8.

In Lugar the court commented on its prior
"tests" for attributing state action to otherwise
private actors:
[The] "something more" which would convert
the private party into a state action might
vary with the circumstances of the case
[T]he court has articulated a number of different factors or tests in different contexts:
e.g., the "public function" test . . . ; the "state
compulsion" test . . . ; the "nexus" test . . . ;
and, in the case of prejudgment attachments a
"joint action test." Whether these different
tests arc actually different in operation or
simply different ways of characterizing the
necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts
the court in such a situation need not be
resolved here.
Although this court relics on the public function
test, that reliance is not to the exclusion of the
other Supreme Court tests. It is just that within
these facts the other tests seem to be encompassed by the public function test. Nevertheless, the extensive regulation of private agencies
by Family Services also could be considered to
establish a sufficient "nexus." "State compulsion" and/or "joint actions" may also exist in
that the Utah statute "encourages" and "authorizes" the resultant termination of parental
rights when the private adoption agency chooses to take custody of the child. Also, a symbiotic relationship exists between private agencies
and the state because as defendants concede the
private agencies reduce the cost that would necessarily have to be born by the state to place

419 U.S. at 352-53, 95 S.Ct. at 454 (emphasis added). In this case we are dealing
with a traditional function of, the state,
This case involves the principle of parens
patriae (parent of the country) whereby
the sovereign is under the duty to act as
guardian for those under legal disability,
The State of Utah has an exclusive and
traditional duty to assure that a child
whose custody has been released to the
state by the natural mother will be placed
in the care of appropriate substitute parents. Although traditionally many private
actors and family members voluntarily
have stepped into parental roles when natural parents have suffered a disability, that
voluntary conduct was not the result of a
legal duty. The State of Utah is the sole
party with such duty. In furtherance of
that duty the state has undertaken to fulfill
its responsibility by automatic termination
of a father's parental rights, which is a
prerequisite to any adoption,9 and delegation of some of its responsibility to private
regulated adoption agencies in finding appropriate substitute parents.10
children if the private entities were not engaged
in that function.
9. See H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations,
§ 18.1 at 602 (1968) (adoption requires that the
legal rights and obligations of natural parents
come to an end before similar rights and obligations can be vested in new adoptive parents).
10. Under Utah's statutory scheme, Family Services statutorily is required to prescribe rules
and regulations for the manner in which private
adoptive agencies are organized, financed, and
administrated. Utah Code Ann. § 55-8a-4
(1986). Specifically, Family Services prescribes
standards for the employment and performance
of private adoption agency employees. Family
Services also writes rules and regulations covering the general standards of practice, the
records required to be kept, the use of homes to
receive and care for children received by the
agency and "any other matters deemed necessary to assure the competency and suitability of
child placing agencies to place children." Id.
Family Services is required to investigate all
applicants for child placing agency status.
§ 55-8a-2. In addition, Family Services is also
granted the authority to conduct investigations
into agency compliance with its regulations
once a license has been issued. Finally, the
statute authorizes Family Services to hold license revocation or suspension proceedings
upon notice. § 55-8a-3.
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The conclusion we reach here that state
action is present should not create a chillj
upon actions of private adoption agencies, j
This court does not rule that all actions and I
decisions by private adoption agencies will)
be subject to review under the constitution. |
Rather this court's holding is limited to the j
role of LDS Social Services and other pri-!
vate parties in triggering the state mandat- j
ed result of § 78-30-4.11 Where as here|
that role is limited as a conduit for the |
implementation of prior state decisions and j
policy
seems clear that no liability for
damage* could attach.
!
[2] A final question is whether the absence of the state or some official thereof
as a named party presents a defect here.!
We think not. The private parties and the!
named state judge are the only parties
from whom requested injunctive reliefj
could be obtained if the statute were to bej
declared unconstitutional.12 In focusingj
upon the conduct that resulted in termi-j

nation of plaintiffs parental rights, only
three principal actors are involved: (1) the
child's mother who relinquished all custody
and control of the child; (2) LDS Social
Services who received custody of the child,
took applications from potential adoptive
parents and delivered custody to the adoptive parents; and (3) John and Jane Doe
who applied for adoption and received custody of the child from LDS Social Services.
This court holds that in a judicial proceeding by a putative father for determination
of his parental rights, the said actors
should be deemed to be state actors for the
limited purpose of challenging operation of
the statute. The Utah Supreme Court appears to agree and implicitly has recognized that operation of § 78-30-4 involves
state action in the context of a private
adoption, even when the state or its officials are not formally joined as parties.13
A similar recognition is found in cases from
other jurisdictions and the United States
Supreme Court.14 In addition, it is clear

of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986)
11. Accordingly, this court makes no finding of]
state action with regard to plaintiffs claim fori
(allowing intervention by putative father in
damages against LDS Social Services. This;
adoption proceeding to raise constitutionality of
court's holding is limited to operation of thej
statute under Federal and State Constitutions);
statute and the plaintiffs request for return of
In the Matter of K.B.E and T.M.E, 740 P.2d 292
custody. That recognition is consistent with the
(Utah Ct.App.1987) (same).
Utah Supreme Court's dicta in Sanchez v. LD.S.\
Social Services, 680 P.2d 753, 755 n. 2 (Utah 14. See In re Adoption of Martz, 102 Misc.2d 102,
1984) that a decision by L.D.S. Social Services
423 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1979), aff'd, In re Adoption of
not to inform a putative father of his duty under!
Jessica "XX", 11 A.D.2d 381, 434 N.Y.S.2d 772
§ 78-30-4 is not state action as well as thej
(1980), aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 417, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20,
dissent in In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717|
430 N.E.2d 896 (1981), aff'd, Uhr v. Robertson,
P.2d 686, 695 (Utah 1986) (Stewart, J. dissent]
463 US. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614
ing) that deception by the mother or other prij
(1983). In Lehr the State of New York was
vate parties as to when a child would be born is|
allowed to intervene as a party but its presence
not state action. See also In the Matter of Peti\
seemingly was not a factor in finding that the
tion of Sieve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 730 P.2d 942J
conduct involved state action which could be
947 (1986) (deception of mother as to child'i
tested in that particular lawsuit. If the state's
custody was not state action).
ability to present argument is a factor in determining whether state action exists in this partic12. It would be of little benefit to name state
ular lawsuit, local rule of practice 6(b) is imporofficers such as the attorney general becausi
tant because the State of Utah has been notified
operation of the statute seemingly has no relaof the challenge to the statute here. At this
tionship to the responsibilities of such officials.
point the state has not sought intervention. See
13. See Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, also In re David Andrew, 56 A.D.2d 627, 391
N.Y.S.2d 846, aff'd. In re David A.C, 43 N.Y.2d
681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984) (suit against privat^
708, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208, 372 N.E.2d 42 (1977),
nonprofit adoption agency and the child's mothrev'd, Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99
er; reference in the editor's case summary to
S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) (appeal from
the defendant as a ''state adoption agencyH is
adoption proceeding involving father and adopincorrect); Sanchez v. LD.S. Social Services,
tive parents); In re: Application of Randall Wal680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984) (suit against private
cott for Adoption of Child, Adoption Case No.
nonprofit adoption agency); Ellis v. Social Ser8466, (Ga.Super.Ct. July 12, 1976), aff'd, 238 Ga.
vices Dept. of the Church of Jesus Christ of
230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977), aff'd, Quilloin v.
Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 198(()
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549. 54 L.Ed.2d
(suit against private nonprofit adoption agency
511 (1978) (appeal from adoption proceeding
and the child's mother). See also In re Adoption
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that the requirement of state action is the
same whether a case is brought in federal
or state court.15 We conclude that plaintiff
has named the proper parties to test the
constitutionality of the alleged "state" deprivation.
II.

Abstention

Defendants have requested that if this
court finds jurisdiction to exist, nevertheless it should abstain from hearing the case
and defer to the ongoing state adoption
proceeding. In Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 41 L.Ed.2d 483
(1976) the Supreme Court reviewed its prior
cases and discussed the propriety of abstention. The court said:
Abstention from the exercise of federal
jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.
"The doctrine of abstention, under which
a District Court may decline to exercise
or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, its an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to
adjudicate a controversy properly before
it. Abdication of the obligation to decide
cases can be justified under this doctrine
only in the exceptional circumstances
where the order to the parties to repair
involving father and adoptive parents). In Quillion the state appeared as amicus curiae before
the Georgia Supreme Court. See also In re the
Matter of Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 358
S.E.2d 459 (1987). In Eason the putative father
filed a petition for legitimation of his biological
child which was objected to by the child's mother, a child placement agency and prospective
adoptive parents. The Georgia Supreme Court
reached the federal constitutional question
raised and said:
But the relationship here between adopting
parents and child did not take place in the
absence of state participation. The adoption
laws were being pursued through the courts
and this accounts for the placement of the
child with the adopting parents. The unwed
father has a constitutionally protected interest
which cannot be denied him through state
action. Only the state can alter its decision to
prevent the development of a parent-child relationship with adopting parents until the
unwed father's rights are resolved. Thus wc
conclude if Scharlach has not abandoned his
opportunity interest, the standard which must
be used to determine his right to legitimate
the child is his fitness as a parent to have

to the state court would clearly serve an
important countervailing interest." . . .
Our decisions have confined the circumstances appropriate for abstention to
three several categories.
(a) Abstention is appropriate "in cases
presenting a federal constitutional issue
which might be mooted or presented in a
different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law." . . .
[Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61
S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941)]
(b) Abstention is also appropriate
where there have been presented difficult questions of state law bearing on
policy problems of substantial public impact whose importance transcends the
result in the case at bar. . . . [Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City ofThibodaux,
3G0 U.S. 25, 79 S.Ct. 1070, 3 L.Ed.2d 1058
(1959)]
(c) Finally; abstention is appropriate
where, absent bad faith, harassment, or
a patently invalid state statute, federal
jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings, Younger [v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971)]
. . . state nuisance proceedings antecedent to a criminal prosecution, which
custody of the child. If he is fit he must
prevail.
The court remanded for a factual determination
involving the previously joined parties. See also
In the Matter of the Petition of Steve B.D., 112
Idaho 22, 730 P.2d 942 (1986) (proceeding involving the prospective adoptive parents and
natural father; court reached federal constitutional question).
15. In Lugar the United States Supreme Court
safd:
If a defendant debtor in state-court debt collection proceedings can successfully challenge, on federal due process grounds, the
plaintiff creditor's resort to the procedures
authorized by a state statute, it is difficult to
understand why that same behavior by the
state-court plaintiff should not provide a
cause of action under § 1983. If the creditorplaintiff violates the debtor-defendant's due
process rights by seizing his property in accordance with statutory procedures, there is
little or no reason to deny to the latter a cause
of action under the federal statute, § 1983,
designed to provide judicial redress for just
such constitutional violations.
457 U,S. at 934, 102 S.Ct. at 2752.
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are directed at obtaining the closure of
places exhibiting obscene films, Huffman [v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95
S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975) ] . . . or
collection of state taxes.
Id. at 813-816, 96 S.Ct at 1244-46.
[3] After careful consideration, this
court has determined that it is appropriate
to exercise discretion by requiring resolution by the state courts of the questions
here presented. This court is persuaded
that this case falls within one or more of
the exceptions explained in Colorado River
Water Conservation District as well as
the longstanding practice of abstention in
domestic relations matters.
A. Pullman Abstention
With regard to the category of abstention involving possible mooting of the federal constitutional question, the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199
(Utah 1984) is important. In that case the
Utah court reviewed the Supreme Court's
opinions in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)
and in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103
S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). The
court then turned to the Utah Constitution
and determined that under the Utah Constitution a putative father receives greater
protection than was granted by the Supreme Court in Lehr under the federal
constitution. Id. 681 P.2d at 206. Based
upon that recognition plaintiff may be able
to establish that as applied the Utah statute is violative of the greater protections of
the state constitution, thereby mooting the
federal constitutional question.
B. Thibodaux Abstention
This case also presents important questions of state law that bear upon policy
issues of considerable importance to the
State of Utah. The importance of the state
interests in this case are born out by early
16. In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686,
689 (Utah 1986); Wells v. Children's Aid Society
of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 206 (Utah 1984); Sanchez
v. LD.S Social Services. 680 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah
1984); Ellis v. Social Sennces Dept. of the

Supreme Court precedent dealing with the
jurisdiction of federal district courts. In In
re Burrus, 130 U.S. 586, 10 S.Ct. 850, 34
L.Ed. 500 (18^0) the court said:
The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, belongs to the laws of the States
and not to the laws of the United States.
As to the right to the control and possession of this (jhild, as it is contested by its
father and ijts grandfather, it is one in
regard to w|iich neither the Congress of
the United States nor any authority of
the United States has any special jurisdiction.
Id. at 593-94, 10 S.Ct. at 853. Later authority has recognized that the theoretical
underpinnings of such Supreme Court recognition is not complete lack of jurisdiction
but rather strbng policies of federal-state
comity. See tfuynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586
F.2d 625, 632 (6th Cir.1978). Accordingly,
federal courtsj ordinarily should defer to
the state counts based upon the state's
strong interest in domestic relations matters, the superior expertise of state courts
in settling such disputes and the possibility
of incompatible state and federal orders.
See Fay v. So^th Colonic Central School
DisL, 802 F.2d|21, 31 (2nd Cir.1986); Peterson v. Babbitt 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir.
1983); Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d
782, 787 (3rd Cir.1972). Based upon the
above policies,! courts have been reluctant
to get into ciistody disputes wherein private parties contest what is in the best
interest of a qiild. See Coats v. Woods,
819 F.2d 236, £37 (9th Cir.1987); Peterson
v. Babbitt, 708] F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir.1983);
LaMontagne p. LaMontagne, 394 F.Supp.
1159, 1160 (DJMass.1975).
Admittedly this case goes beyond a mere
private dispute over the best interests of a
child and goes to the heart of Utah's statutory scheme. Plaintiff correctly points out
that the Utahj Supreme Court has upheld
the facial validity of § 78-30-4.16 HowChurch of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615
?2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980). Plaintiff here contends that the jmost recent opinion, In re Adoption of Baby Eipy Doe, so significantly alters the
operation of the statute that it amounts to a
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ever, the Supreme Court of Utah has defined an ''impossibility" exception to the
statute, and there is considerable reason to
believe the Utah courts are interpreting
§ 78-30-4 in a way that will meet the federa! constitutional questions raised here.17
The state's interests at stake here* are
great, and the Utah courts have evidenced
a willingness to balance the interests of
putative fathers in individual cases within
the purview of a constitutional statute.
This court considers that the Utah courts
they ought to be given further opportunity
to do so. In Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,
99 S.Ct. 2371, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979) the
Supreme Court recognized as much:
facial attack on the statute. At least one commeniaior agrees. See Note, Termination of an
Unwed Father's Parental Rights, 1987 Utah
L.Rev. 220, 221. For other commentary on the
In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe case see L.
Wardle, The Adoption Conundrum Part I, 1987
Utah Lawyer Alert No. 4 at 4-8; L. Wardle, The
Adoption Conundrum Part II, 1987 Utah Lawyer
Alert No. 5 at 6-9; Note, The Putative Fathers*
Due Process Rights to Notice and a Hearing: In
re Baby Boy Doe, 1986 B.Y.U. L.Rev. 1081.
17. In Ellis the Utah Supreme Court first defined
;4n impossibility exception under § 78-30-4.
he court said that if it was "impossible for the
father to file the required notice of paternity
prior to the statutory bar, through no fault of his
own . . . and he came forward within a reasonable time after the baby's birth, he should be
deemed to have complied with the statute." 615
P.2d at 1256 (emphasis added). In its most
recent interpretation of the impossibility exception the Supreme Court overruled a specific
finding of fact by the trial court that it was not
"impossible" for the father to have complied
with § 78-30-4. In so doing the court engaged
in a factually specific analysis of the operation
or" the statute in terms or" fairness to trie particular father involved. The Utah Supreme Court
said:
[TJhe standards enunciated in [our] cases
were developed in recognition of the need to
balance the competing interests in this type of
case; the significant state interest in speedily
placing infants for adoption and the constitutionally protected rights of putative fathers.
See Wells, 681 P.2d at 202-03. In all but the
most exceptional cases, the operation of section 78-3-04 achieves that balance as it affords putative fathers the opportunity to assert and protect their rights while providing a
finite point at which the state's interest supercedes that of the father. However, where a
father docs not know of the need to protect
his rights, there is no "reasonable opportunity" to assert or protect parental rights. In

The final concern prompted by broad facial attacks on state statutes is the
threat to our federal system of government posed by "the needless obstruction
to the domestic policy of the states by
forestalling state action in construing
and applying its own statutes."

State courts are the principal expositors
of state law. Almost every constitutional challenge—and particularly one
as far ranging as that involved in this
case—offers the opportunity for narrowing constructions that might obviate the constitutional problem and insuch a case, the operation of the statute fails
Jo achieve the desired balance and raises serious due process concerns. Although we have
previously established that actual notice is not
required prior to termination of parental
rights under section 78-30-4(3), Wells, 681
P.2d at 207, that determination was based at
least in part on the assumption that "(n]otice
requirements may be satisfied when necessarily implied," Ellis, 615 P.2d at 1256, n. 16
(citation omitted), i.e., in the usual case where
the putative father knows or should know of
the birth and can reasonably take the timely
action required to avoid the statutory bar.
Under the circumstances of this case, however, including the clearly articulated intent
of the father to keep and rear the child, the
full knowledge of that intent on the part of all
involved, the representations made by the
rnother, the actions of her family, the premature birth, and the non-residency of the father
coupled with his absence at the time of birth,
we cannot say that this was either a usual
case or that notice may be implied. We therefore conclude that appellant has successfully
shown "that the termination of his parental
rights was contrary to basic notions of due
process, and that he came forward within a
reasonable time after the baby's birth, [such
that] he should be deemed to have complied
with the statute." In re Adoption of Baby Boy
Doe, 717 P.2d at 691.
In an even more recent opinion the Utah Court
of Appeals found a remand unnecessary to determine impossibility where a putative father
filed a notice of paternity hours after a petition
for adoption was filed. The court acknowledged that the father failed timely to file in
accordance with the statute but held that in the
circumstances application of the statute's bar
would violate fundamental fairness. In the
Matter of K.B.E and T.M.E, 740 P.2d 292, 29697 (Utah Ct.App.1987). The court engaged in a
balancing analysis apparently independent of a
determination of impossibility.

telligently mediate federal
constitutional concerns and state
interest
When federal courts disrupt that process
of mediation while interjecting themselves in such disputes, they prevent the
informed evolution of state policy by
state tribunals
The price exacted in
terms of comity would only be outweighed if state courts were not competent to adjudicate federal constitutional
claims—a postulate we have repeatedly
and emphatically rejected.
In sum, the only pertinent inquiry is
whether the state proceedings afford an
adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional claims and Texas law appears to
raise no procedural barriers.
Id. at 430, 99 S.Ct, at 2380-81.
Under all of the circumstances this court
is persuaded that under the doctrine of
Thibodaux it should defer to the state
courts to allow them to fulfill their duty to
further Utah's policy in balancing the competing interests in adoption cases consistent with federal constitutional principles.
C.

Younger

Abstention

Under the Younger abstention doctrine a
federal court will not grant injunctive or
declaratory relief if the federal plaintiff is
a party to a state criminal proceeding and
the party can raise the constitutional issue
in the state proceeding. Younger has been
extended by the Supreme Court to civil
contexts when the state is a party to a civil
proceeding and the action is in aid of and
closely related to criminal statutes. See
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 99 S.Ct. 2371,
18. Some courts do not require that the State be
a direct party so long as significant state interests are involved. Under that view the state
adoption proceeding would seem to meet the
test. This is an unsettled area of the law, however. See Ellin v. Robb. 458 U.S. 1112, 102 S.Ct.
34%, 73 L.Ed.2d 1375 {\W7) (White. 3. dissenting from denial of certiorari, joined by Brennan, J. on basis that whether Younger applies to
a private dispute (in Robb a custody dispute) is
a question that needs to be finally resolved by
the Supreme Court).
19. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d
686 (Utaii 1986), Ellis v. Social Serxnces of the

60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979) (involving state statute authorizing temporary removal of child
in child abuse context). In this case plaintiff seeks) to enjoin the ongoing adoption
proceeding and thus Younger\s recognized
policy of noninterference applies. However, application of Younger to the facts of
this case would require extension of the
principle in two respects: (1) here the plaintiff in the federal proceeding is not a party
to the ongoing adoption proceeding; and (2)
the State pf Utah is not a directly named
party in the adoption proceeding.18 Accordingly, this court finds it unnecessary to
rely on Younger abstention because w
have founql that Thibodaux abstention here
applies. I
Despite nonreliance on Younger, this
court recqgnizes that for any principle of
abstention to apply it is necessary that the
plaintiff have an avenue available in state
court. Inithis case the statute, § 78-3(M,
provides that plaintiffs failure to file a
notice of [paternity prior to the time his
child was placed with L.D.S. Social Services
bars him "from thereafter bringing or
maintaining any action to establish his paternity of the child/' However, defendants
point out that through intervention in the
adoption proceeding or through filing a habeas corpiis petition putative fathers have
obtained s^ate court review of the constitutionality oi § 78-30-4 as applied to them.15
The court also notes that ultimate recourse
to federalj court from an adverse state
court decision is not cut off.20 In all
events, this court in finding abstention to
be appropriate assumes that plaintiff will
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615
PJd 1250l(Utah 1980); In the Matter of K.B.E
and T.M.R, 740 P.2d 292 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
20. If plairitiff challenges § 78-30-4 in stale
court and t|he court upholds the statute, plaintiff
will have a right of appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2). The
Court's appellate jurisdiction is nondiscrction
ary although the Court need not give the case
plenary review. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.
332. 343-44, 95 S.Ct. 2281. 2289, 45 L.Ed.2d 223
(1975).
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have an adequate opportunity for review in
state court.21
Based upon the above analysis, plaintiff's
motion for preliminary injunction is denied
and defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted without prejudice to resolution of the
matter in the state courts of Utah. This
Memorandum Decision and Order will suffice as the court's final action on this motion; no further Order need be prepared by
counsel.
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CONNECTICUT SAVINGS BANK, Heritage Savings and Loan Association,
et al., Plaintiffs,
SAVERS FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION and Cushman
and Wakefield of Pennsylvania, Inc.
a / k / a Cushman and Wakefield Appraisal Division, Defendants.
SAVERS FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, Third-Party
Plaintiff,

third-party claim against appraisers, and
appraisers removed action from state to
federal district court. Original plaintiffs
and third-party plaintiffs moved to remand.
The District Court, Aronovitz, J., held that
third-party action was improvidently removed.
Motion granted.

1. Removal of Cases <e=56
Under removal statute, third-party
claim is "separate and independent" from
claims raised in main action if it is susceptible of adjudication separate and apart from
claims raised in main action. 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1441(c).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

2. Removal of Cases <s=56
Third-party action filed by permanent
financiers against appraisers allegedly responsible for financier's breach of loan purchase agreement was improvidently removed to federal district court; financiers'
third-party claims were not "separate and
independent" from breach of contract
claims raised in main action. 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1441(c).

v.
CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION and Cushman and
Wakefield of Pennsylvania, Inc. a / k / a
Cushman and Wakefield Appraisal Division, Third-Party Defendants.
No. 86-12002-Civ.

Alice BJackwell White, Broad and Cassel,
Maitland, Fla., O.H. Storey, III, Hoover,
Jacobs & Storey, Little Rock, Ark., Robert
E. Doyle, Asbell, Hains, Doyle & Pickworth, Naples, Fla., for Savers Federal
Sav. and Loan Ass'n.

April 16, 1987.

Leigh E. Dunston, Gunster, Yoakley,
Criser & Stewart, P.A., West Palm Beach,
Fla., George Vega, Jr., Vega, Brown, Nichols, Stanley & Martin, Naples, Fla., for City
Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n.

Action was brought against permanent
financiers for their alleged breach of loan
purchase agreement.
Financiers filed

Leo J. Salvatori, Quarles & Brady, Naples, Fla., Gary R. Battistoni, Drinker, Biddie & Reath, Philadelphia, Pa., for Solamar
Venture, Ltd.

United States District Court,
S.D. Florida,
Miami Division.

21. If after diligent effort by plaintiff, and cooperation from the defendants, plaintiff is unable
to obtain review in the state courts of Utah this
court will be required to exercise its jurisdic-

tion. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30-31, 79 S.Ct. 1070, 3
L.Ed.2d 1058 (1959).

